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Abstract
We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribu-
tion over the Internet: peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing and centralized client-server distribution.
We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p file sharing where all peers are endowed
with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the network is conducive
to sharing by a significant number of peers, even if sharing is costlier than freeriding. We build
on this model of p2p to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit-maximizing firm, such as Apple,
that offers content available at positive prices. We characterize the size of the p2p network as
a function of the firm’s pricing strategy, and show that the firm may be better off setting high
prices, allowing the network to survive, and that the p2p network may work more efficiently in
the presence of the firm than in its absence.
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1 Introduction
Since the inception of copyright law to grant intellectual property owners a temporal monopoly
on their works, the ability to capture value by copyright holders has persistently been threatened
by unauthorized reproduction of content. Technological innovations have not only presented new
market opportunities but also new threats. The radio, the cassette player, the video recorder, and
the compact disc have allowed the industry to deliver additional value and meet new demand. But
these same technologies have also been employed to replicate and distribute content without the
consent of copyright holders.
In recent years, advances in the digitalization of content paired with the widespread adoption of
broadband Internet have shaped a new and formidable threat with the emergence of peer-to-peer
(p2p) file sharing networks. Peer-to-peer file sharing has grown spectacularly in recent years. The
content industry has reacted, with limited success, by legally confronting the p2p phenomenon
and slowly embracing online distribution. Apple’s iTunes Store, built on a traditional client-server
architecture, has emerged as the dominant player in the market for legal digital downloads.
Peer-to-peer and licensed online stores constitute two fundamentally different distribution mod-
els that ‘compete’ against each other. Demanders of digital content are faced with the choice of
whether to download content from p2p file sharing networks or from legal sites. The ability (or
even the desire) of Apple to sustain high prices for downloads is affected by the presence of p2p file
sharing networks. Likewise, the success of p2p file sharing is partly determined by actions taken
by Apple and the majors such as pricing per download, the proneness to embark into legal action
against users of p2p, their relationships with and demands from Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
and the like.
In this paper we present a simple formal model to investigate how these two systems of digital
distribution interact. Our model begins with the observation that peers in p2p networks face a
fundamental choice between sharing content and freeriding. Sharing entails additional costs for the
peer: committing computing resources such as storage space and upload bandwidth to the network
and increasing the likelihood of legal action against her. When a peer in a p2p network decides
to share content, she is effectively supplying two different goods. On the one hand, she provides
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content. Obviously, the peer who shares does not benefit from the content that she is sharing as she
already owns it. In the absence of social preferences (i.e., altruism, reciprocity...), providing content
has no direct benefit to the peer who shares. On the other hand, by sharing, a peer also supplies
upload bandwidth to the network and this may result in lower network congestion. Sharing results
in lower congestion if upload bandwidth is a scarce resource. Based on the available empirical
evidence, we assume this to be the case.
Similarly to content, bandwidth is a nonexcludable good. When a peer provides upload band-
width to the network she cannot decide who will or will not have access to that bandwidth. But
contrary to content, bandwidth is a rival good because its use by one peer prevents use by another
peer. We show that the nature of p2p networks, however, warrants that the provision of bandwidth
benefits all peers equally in expected terms. Indeed, when a peer decides to share content, the
average number of peers connected to sharers decreases (because there are more peers to connect
to) and this reduces average network congestion. In sum, peers face a trade off: by sharing they
bear costs that could be avoided by freeriding, but sharing also reduces average network congestion
and this benefits every peer, including the peer who shares.
Building on this insight, we construct a model where peers provide bandwidth in addition to
content when they share. Specifically, we consider a finite population of agents that derive positive
and homogenous utility from digital content. Peers suffer disutility from the costs associated with
downloading content. These costs are proportional to the time required to complete downloads,
the level of congestion, which in turn depends on the bandwidth provision available in the network.
Peers may reduce their expected congestion by providing upload bandwidth to other peers. We
model this decision as a binary choice: share content or freeride. By allowing agents to differ in their
disutility of congestion (or impatience) we show that an endogenous level of sharing emerges in the
network. This depends on the size of the network, the costs faced by agents, and the disutility
of congestion of the population. Selfish utility-maximizing peers are better off sharing because
by doing so they face less congestion. We fully characterize the congestion faced and the utility
enjoyed by all participants.
We build on this framework to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit-maximizing firm that
offers the same content available on the network. Contrary to p2p networks, online stores offer legal
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and fast downloads, based on traditional client-server architectures, at positive prices.1 We derive
the demand function faced by the firm and characterize its optimal pricing strategy. We show that
the firm may be better off setting high prices instead of attempting to shut the p2p network down
by lowering prices. Moreover, we show that the p2p network may function more efficiently in the
presence of the firm than in its absence.
The model captures important stylized facts identified by the literature. First, Asvanund et
al. [5] show that congestion worsens as the size of p2p networks grow. Our model generates this
result endogenously. In fact, the effect of network size on congestion helps explain the coexistence
of multiple p2p networks. The model can also accommodate positive network effects when users
value content variety.
Second, many studies have shown that heavy users of p2p file sharing networks are more prone
to purchase content online.2 Our framework not only suggests that there is no contradiction in this
observed behavior, but also sheds light on the factors that explain the demand for online content
in the presence of a p2p network.
Third, we show that the firm has an additional incentive to charge high prices, compared to what
a standard model of vertical differentiation would predict. When prices are high, more consumers
prefer to download from the p2p network. As a consequence, congestion increases and the value of
the p2p network decreases, increasing the attractiveness of the firm’s product.
Finally, researchers and industry analysts have long questioned the existence of applications
that drive broadband demand (“killer apps”).3 Our model shows that file sharing networks strictly
benefit from improvements in broadband capacity, creating value for all participants.4 A study
performed by Internet research firm CacheLogic in 2005 revealed that over 60% of total Internet
traffic belonged to p2p file sharing applications.5 This suggests that file sharing is indeed a driver
for broadband demand. We believe that our results should be of interest to all participants in
1Note that an online store could be set up to distribute content through p2p, rather than through a client-server
model. Motivated by iTunes’ success, however, we assume that the firm not only has centralized governance but
that it also distributes through a client-server model that provides content instantly. We show that the use of a
client-server architecture for distribution is a critical source of advantage for the firm.
2See, for example, ‘Downloading myths challenged,’ BBC News.com, July 27, 2005.
3See Crandall and Alleman [14].
4See Parker [32].
5See Johnson et al. [25].
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markets for digital information goods.
1.1 Literature
This paper contributes to an emerging literature in Strategy that explores competitive interaction
between organizations with different business models. While there are several formal models of
asymmetric competition that exist in Strategy (differences in costs, resources endowments or infor-
mation, mainly), the asymmetries that this literature wrestles with are of a different nature: firms
with fundamentally different objective functions, opposed approaches to competing, or different
governance structures. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat [10], for example, introduce a dynamic
mixed duopoly model in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with an open source com-
petitor that prices at zero with the installed base affecting their relative values over time and
Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie [13] study competitive interactions between two complementors,
Microsoft and Intel, with asymmetries in their objectives functions stemming from technology –
software vs. hardware.
Interest in the study of competitive interactions between organizations with different business
models has increased in the last few years as new technologies, regulatory changes, and new cus-
tomer demands have allowed firms to implement new approaches to competing in a wide range
of industries spanning from airlines (Ryanair) to furniture (Ikea) and from the circus (Cirque du
Soleil) to software (open source projects). In fact, many of the fastest-growing firms in the recent
past appear to have taken advantage of opportunities sparked by globalization, deregulation, or
technological change to ‘compete differently’ and to innovate in their business models.
To assess the sustainability of competitive advantage of new business models it is critical to
understand how they interact with those of other players. So far, the literature has studied interac-
tions between new and traditional business models. This paper studies the competitive interactions
between two new business models: p2p file sharing and profit-maximizing client-server digital dis-
tribution.
Our model of p2p (Sections 4 and 5) also contributes to a growing literature on the economics
of peer-to-peer file sharing. This literature asks why individuals share files in p2p networks. The
pioneering work of Adar and Huberman [1] revealed that 70% of Gnutella users share no files,
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a phenomenon dubbed ‘the tragedy of the digital commons:’ because contributing files is costlier
than freeriding, selfish utility maximizers ‘should’ freeride and this should lead to the collapse of the
network. The problem has been related to the provision of public goods, as discussed by Krishnan
et al. [26] and [28]. Our work contributes to this debate by separating the two different goods
that are provided by peers who share: content and bandwidth. We focus on the provision of scarce
bandwidth in open p2p networks, a rival and nonexcludable good. Separating both goods is helpful
because they are different in nature as content is a pure public good (nonrival and nonexcludable).
In order to analyze the extent of freeriding and design schemes to reduce it, the literature has,
for the most part, assumed that individuals are concerned with each others’ wellbeing. Altruistic
agents, for example, realize a direct benefit from contributing content. Golle et al. [20] and
Antoniadis et al. [3] consider agents that derive utility from contributing content to the network.
Feldman et al. [19] explicitly consider agent types which differ in their willingness to contribute.
Ranganathan et al. [33] and Feldman et al. [18] model the problem as a repeated prisoners’
dilemma game, where the network collapses in the absence of generosity. Cunningham et al. [16]
assume reciprocity by a positive fraction of users, where increased sharing by some ensures a further
increase in the overall provision. And Jian and MacKie-Mason [24] present a model of generalized
reciprocity where peers share expecting others in the network to indirectly reciprocate. Our model
is one of selfish, utility-maximizing agents. While social preferences underlie many aspects of human
behavior, their role in large p2p networks where thousands of individuals interact anonymously is
debatable. In the absence of peers caring about each others’ utility, the question of why peer-to-peer
networks such as Gnutella exhibit sharing is still open to argument.
Our approach builds on the notion of endogenous congestion to characterize the aggregate
properties of p2p networks and their scalability. Asvanund et al. [5] analyze p2p traffic data
and build a stylized model based on congestion, Krishnan et al. [27] propose some theoretical
implications of congestion to explain sharing by selfish peers, and Butler [9] presents a conceptual
framework for the scalability of online communities. To the best of our knowledge, no earlier model
of p2p file sharing has bridged the aggregate properties of these networks and the local interactions
between peers concerned solely about the impact of their actions on their own utility. In addition,
the literature on the economics of p2p has not considered interactions between p2p and for-profit
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client-server distribution models.
Based on Gnutella traffic data, Asvanund et al. [4] examine the benefits of club formation,
which can reduce freeriding by excluding peers with low levels of contribution from the network.
While excludability opens several interesting issues in the context of p2p, we focus instead on open
and nonexcludable networks (which have become the most widespread and successful instances of
the technology), the size of which is endogenously determined as peers compare the expected utility
of joining them versus available outside options.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the phenomenon that we study. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the building blocks of our model of peer-to-peer file sharing. In Section 4 we
present a simple approximation to the average congestion in an arbitrary peer-to-peer network.
Section 5 derives the equilibrium network configuration and studies its properties. In Section 6 we
introduce a profit-maximizing firm that competes for users against the p2p network and analyze
interdependencies that arise between both models of digital distribution. All the proofs are in the
appendix.
2 Peer-to-Peer vs. iTunes6
The technology enabling peer-to-peer networks became mainstream in 1999 with the release of
a music file sharing application called Napster. Contrary to a client-server model, in which all
communication takes place through a central server, peer-to-peer architectures allow every computer
to directly communicate with others in the same network (running the same software) without
having to go through intermediaries. This network topology increases scalability and robustness
for a wide range of applications and is an active area of research.7 File sharing has so far been the
most disruptive and widespread application of p2p architectures.
A file sharing network allows participants to offer digital content for download to other connected
peers, enabling content exchange to take place on a large scale. Because the value of file sharing
6This section draws from Casadesus-Masanell, Hervas-Drane, and Mitchell [12]. See also Casadesus-Masanell,
Hervas-Drane, and Sean Silverthorne [11].
7Applications of p2p networks include: file sharing (Napster, BitTorrent and eMule), distributed computing
(SETI@home and Folding@home) and voice over IP (Skype). These applications all create an overlay network over
the host network (generally the Internet). For a detailed review of the technology see Schollmeier [34].
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networks depends on individual contributions and a high proportion of users consume network
resources without contributing their own, congestion is one main problem in p2p. Depending on
the resources available, downloading a full music album can take anywhere from minutes to hours.
Sometimes downloads do not complete at all.
Peer-to-peer file sharing and iTunes constitute two different paradigms for digital content distri-
bution over the Internet. Contrary to p2p networks, Apple and its partners appear to be motivated
by profit maximization. iTunes offers downloads on a traditional client-server architecture at pos-
itive prices, averaging at $0.99/song in the U.S. The client-server architecture allows Apple to
manage congestion. A full music album can be downloaded from iTunes over a broadband connec-
tion in less than three minutes, and a song in just a few seconds.
Content distributed through p2p networks has several advantages over licensed content dis-
tributed through iTunes. Digital Rights Management (DRM) restrictions render licensed content
an inferior good compared to unlicensed content; only the latter can be played back on any mul-
timedia device and is future-proof compatible.8 Digital encoding quality makes for an ambiguous
case between both systems, and it is not infrequent for the same content to be available at higher
quality in p2p networks.
But peer-to-peer distribution also has disadvantages. iTunes offers not only faster content
download but it is also well-integrated with the iPod. In addition, iTunes metadata (file naming
and tagging) is superior to that of files distributed through p2p. Moreover, iTunes is legal while
users of p2p networks are generally open to legal action against them. Figure 1 summarizes the
main dimensions on which p2p and iTunes differ.
Non-commercial p2p iTunes
Free content Pay for content
No DRM restrictions DRM restrictions 
Bad metadata Good metadata 
Congestion (slow downloads) No congestion (fast downloads)
More difficult to use Easy to use 
Mostly illegal Legal 
Heavy use of upload bandwidth (sharers) Little use of upload bandwidth
Figure 1: Non-commercial p2p vs. iTunes.
8See “Big Content: ludicrous to expect DRMed music to work forever,” ArsTechnica.com, July 29 2009. While the
music industry has gradually eliminated DRM requirements in recent years, video content largely continues subject
to DRM restrictions. See “iTunes Store goes DRM-free,” MacWorld.com, January 6 2009.
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Both models have grown rapidly in the past few years. As of 2006, it is estimated that over 10
million users participate in p2p file sharing networks worldwide at any given instant. BigCham-
pagne.com found that over 90% of the content exchanged was copyrighted. And according to
CacheLogic.com, over 60% of Internet traffic in Europe and the U.S. was accounted for by p2p file
sharing. In a 2005 survey, half of the experts consulted believed that file sharing on p2p networks
will still be easy even a decade from now.9 Apple, on the other hand, in 2006 claimed more than
80% shares of U.S. legal music downloads.10 And according to the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America (RIAA), in 2005 iTunes outsold several large traditional music retailers such as
Tower Records, Borders, and Sam Goody.11 Presently, iTunes offers more than 10 million songs for
download and has sold six billion songs since going online in 2003.
Copious amounts of airtime has been given to p2p’s effect on music industry players. Some
industry participants feel that p2p file sharing is destroying the industry. The RIAA, for example,
claims that piracy cost the industry $4.2 billion each year on a worldwide basis.12 The RIAA has
been at the center of the battle against p2p networks, first starting with lawsuits against MP3.com
in 1997, then Diamond Media in 1998 for their MP3 player and then Napster in 1999. Lawsuits
against other p2p networks have continued (Kazaa, Morpheus, and Grokster in 2001) but to little
avail. In 2003, the RIAA launched lawsuits against 261 individuals and continued to do so over the
following years. More recently, the RIAA is attempting to block traffic of copyrighted content over
p2p by reaching agreements with ISPs. Meanwhile, numerous consumer groups and online activists,
such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, feel that p2p represents unmatched opportunities the
industry has failed to understand.
3 The model
Consider a population of M agents that obtain utility from the consumption of digital information
goods. They all value content equally and differ only in their disutility of congestion. We model
the formation of a p2p file sharing network as a two stage process. In the first stage, agents choose
9See Pew Internet & American life project 2005 survey on ‘The future of the Internet.’
10See ‘France Poised To Soften Controversial iTunes Bill,’ CNNMoney.com, June 21, 2006.
11See ‘iTunes outsells traditional music stores,’ CNET News.com, November 21, 2005.
12RIAA website, www.riaa.com.
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(simultaneously) whether or not to join the network. In the second stage, agents interconnect
and downloads are realized. We will refer to agents in the network as peers and those outside as
outsiders. We let N ≤ M denote the number of peers, so the number of outsiders is given by
M − N . Agents who choose to belong to the network can either share their content or freeride.
Sharers offer content for download by other peers while freeriders do not. Sharing content is costly,
but some sharing is required for the network to survive as downloads can only be realized from
other peers. We assume that peers are anonymous, that they cannot coordinate their actions, and
that no peer can be excluded from accessing the network.
Let ud denote the utility derived from content once a download has been completed. We assume
that ud is common across all content and peers. This simplifies the analysis and allows us to focus on
the role of congestion as a determinant of peers’ willingness to contribute content (and bandwidth).
The assumption amounts to stating that content is not a scarce resource. As will become clear
shortly, the scarce resource in our model is bandwidth.13
We assume that every peer suffers a positive cost cn of using the p2p network. This captures
the opportunity costs of computing resources employed, the bandwidth for signaling traffic required
to remain connected to the network until a download completes, and possible legal action against
the peer. In addition to cn, sharers (but not freeriders) bear cost cs. This is the cost of offering
content for download on a public p2p network, including the use of additional computing resources
such as storage space and upload bandwidth and the increased likelihood of legal action against
sharers (over and above that faced by freeriders). Since both cn and cs are incurred over time, the
total costs incurred by any given peer will depend on how long she remains actively connected to
the p2p network.14
To introduce the disutility of congestion experienced by peer i, we use ρi ≥ 0 which is a measure
of how impatient peer i is. The larger ρi is, the higher the disutility from the time required to
complete a download. Without loss of generality we choose indexes i so that ρi ≤ ρi+1 for all i. All
other costs being equal, peers prefer to obtain content immediately avoiding congestion delays.
13If every sharer contributes sufficiently many files, a peer will always find some content they value at ud when
downloading from any given sharer. The specific content may differ depending on the sharer, though.
14Copyright holders willing to prosecute sharers need to crawl p2p networks in order to identify them, in a manner
similar to how Google crawls webpages to index them. This implies that changes in peer activity (just as changes in
webpage content) are not captured instantaneously.
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Finally, we let td be the time required to complete a download. This download time is endoge-
nous and depends on the level of congestion which, in turn, will depend on the proportion of peers
sharing content in the network. Lower bandwidth provision implies higher levels of congestion
resulting in higher download time.
With all the notation in place, we express the utility of a peer that freerides as
ufi = ud − (cn + ρi)td, (1)
and that of a peer who shares content as
usi = ud − (cn + cs + ρi)td, (2)
where i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., N}. Outside utility is normalized to zero.15
In the second stage, after peers have decided whether to share or to freeride, interconnections
take place. Let S ⊂ N be the set of sharers (given the agents’ first-stage strategies) and denote
by S the number of sharers (the cardinality of S). We assume all peers have an upload bandwidth
capacity of 1/θ, where θ > 0. Because delay (congestion) is measured by the inverse of bandwidth,
this implies that a downloader exclusively served by a sharer downloads a unit of content in θ units
of time. That is, we normalize to td = θ the time required for a download when a peer is served by
a sharer that receives no other incoming connections. Parameter θ captures the residential capacity
offered by the broadband infrastructure; the relationship between the file size and the bandwidth
capacity available to peers. An improvement in broadband infrastructure that increases available
bandwidth, decreases download times and amounts to a reduction in θ.16 Download bandwidth
capacity of peers is assumed not to be a limiting factor. If more than one downloader are connected
to a given sharer, upload bandwidth is shared evenly amongst them. This can be interpreted as
downloading taking place simultaneously or, alternatively, the sharer serving download queues for
15Note that we could redefine ρi as ρi + cn and omit cn from our specification. For clarity of exposition, however,
we prefer to use both cn and ρi, as this notation allows us to separate the costs of using the network from agent
heterogeneity. The benefits of this notation become clearest in Section 5.2 where ρi ∼ U [0, ρ¯].
16An improvement in encoding efficiency reducing file sizes has the same effect. In practice these improvements
tend to be modest in comparison to changes in broadband infrastructure. We focus our discussion below on the
latter.
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fractions of content by turns.
The following two definitions are helpful in what follows:
Network allocation: A set of links connecting peers to sharers where every peer connects to
one sharer only and no sharer connects to herself.
Stable network allocation: A network allocation such that no peer can be made strictly
better off by connecting to a different sharer.
We assume that following the first stage, a stable network allocation ensues. If a social planner
were to assign peers to sharers to distribute bandwidth as equitably as possible, only stable allo-
cations would be considered.17 Similarly, if peers were given the choice to update their link in a
random sequence, the resulting network allocations would also be stable. Clearly, if the network
allocation was not stable, at least one peer would have incentives to update her link and connect
to a different sharer. We assume for simplicity that all stable allocations are equiprobable.
To summarize, our model of p2p assumes:
• All peers have 1/θ units of upload bandwidth capacity;
• All peers have at least 1/θ units of download bandwidth capacity;
• Every peer connects to one sharer only;
• A sharer may not connect to herself;
• Upload bandwidth is allocated equably amongst all peers connected to a sharer;
• Second-stage network allocations are stable and equiprobable.
Finally, the following mild assumption on the parameters is required for the results: ud >
(cn + cs + ρi)θ for all i. This ensures that sharing in a p2p network with minimum congestion is
always preferred to the outside option of not participating in the network.
With the notation in place, we proceed to solving the model. We start by considering a fixed
number of sharers (S) and network size (N) and present a simple approximation to average con-
gestion. In Section 5 we endogenize the sharing decision, and in Section 6 we endogenize the size of
17The decision rule followed by such a social planner can be implemented by a centralized algorithm that assigns
the links of all peers.
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the network by allowing agents to not consume content or download from the firm instead of using
the p2p network.
4 Network foundation
In this section we present an approximation to the average congestion in an arbitrary peer-to-
peer network with an exogenous number of sharers and freeriders. This provides a foundation for
download time td in the second stage of our model, a central variable of our analysis. Congestion
plays a crucial role in our development as peers choose to share taking into consideration the
effect that their sharing has on congestion. In Section 5 we analyze the first stage and endogenize
the number of sharers and freeriders. This section follows our work with Albert Creus-Mir on
bandwidth allocation in p2p file sharing networks (see Creus-Mir et al. [15]).
To simplify the exposition, suppose initially that θ = 1. Thus all peers have one unit of upload
bandwidth capacity. Given a network allocation, the bandwidth obtained by peer i ∈ N can be
computed as follows: if the peer is connected to a sharer to which k other peers are connected
to, then peer i obtains effective bandwidth 1/(k + 1). Freeriders are allowed to connect to every
sharer. Therefore, they have S possible links available to choose from. Sharers, on the other hand,
cannot connect to themselves. As a consequence, sharers have S − 1 possible links available. This
implies that, in general, the bandwidth obtained by both groups of peers will differ. To compute
the expected bandwidth for freeriders and sharers in a network with N peers and S sharers, we
begin by computing each peer’s effective bandwidth in every stable network allocation. We then
average these effective bandwidths assuming that every stable network allocation is equally likely.
The following example illustrates our approach.
Example 1 N = 5 and S = {S1, S2}. There are three freeriding peers: F1, F2, and F3. In this
example there are exactly six stable network allocations.
• Stable network allocation 1: S1 → S2 (this means that S1 connects to and downloads from
S2), S2 → S1, F1 → S2, F2 → S1, and F3 → S1. No peer can be made better off by changing
her connection only.
12
– Effective bandwidths (resp.): 12 ,
1
3 ,
1
2 ,
1
3 , and
1
3 .
• Stable network allocation 2: S1 → S2, S2 → S1, F1 → S1, F2 → S2, and F3 → S1.
– Effective bandwidths (resp.): 12 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
2 , and
1
3 .
• Stable network allocation 3: S1 → S2, S2 → S1, F1 → S1, F2 → S1, and F3 → S2.
– Effective bandwidths (resp.): 12 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , and
1
2 .
• Stable network allocation 4: S1 → S2, S2 → S1, F1 → S1, F2 → S2, and F3 → S2.
– Effective bandwidths (resp.): 13 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
3 , and
1
3 .
• Stable network allocation 5: S1 → S2, S2 → S1, F1 → S2, F2 → S1, and F3 → S2.
– Effective bandwidths (resp.): 13 ,
1
2 ,
1
3 ,
1
2 , and
1
3 .
• Stable network allocation 6: S1 → S2, S2 → S1, F1 → S2, F2 → S2, and F3 → S1.
– Effective bandwidths (resp.): 13 ,
1
2 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , and
1
2 .
The expected bandwidth of sharers is 16
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1
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1
3 +
1
3 +
1
3
)
= 512 ≈ 0.417. The expected
bandwidth of freeriders is 718 ≈ 0.389. On average, sharers face less congestion than freeriders.
The computational complexity of the problem increases with the number of stable allocations,
which grows rapidly with N . In [15] we derive an exact expression for the expected bandwidths
of both types of peers. Unfortunately, the exact formula is far too complex to be used in applied
models. However, in that paper we show that S/N is a good approximation to the expected
bandwidth of both sharers and freeriders. Moreover, we show that the expected bandwidth of
sharers is always greater than or equal to S/N and that that of freeriders is always less than or
equal to S/N .18
18It is easy to see that S/N is the ‘dividing line.’ Let Bu be the total upload bandwidth of all sharers. Let bs and
bf be the expected bandwidth of sharers and freeriders respectively. Then, Bu = bsS + bfF . Notice that S = Bu.
Therefore, S = bsS+ bfF . Rearranging, we have that bf = S (1− bs) /F . Recall that F = N −S. Therefore we have
bf = S (1− bs) / (N − S). Dividing numerator and denominator by N we obtain bf =
S
N
“
1−bs
1− S
N
”
. Clearly, bs > S/N
implies that bf < S/N .
13
It is interesting that sharers obtain a slightly higher bandwidth than freeriders even if they face
more constraints than freeriders (as they cannot connect to themselves). As N grows the difference
between expected bandwidths and S/N decreases. In fact, already in a network of size N = 10,
the expected bandwidth of sharers and freeriders differs from S/N by, at most, 0.0012.19 And
when N = 100 the difference is always less than 0.0000064. Moreover, when N is a multiple of
S, the expected bandwidth of sharers and freeriders coincides and is equal to S/N . Notice also
that our approximation punishes (slightly) sharers and rewards (slightly) freeriders. Therefore, the
approximation makes it ‘harder’ for peers to share. If instead of using the approximation we used
the exact formula, our results would only be strengthened.
Our model is a simplified abstraction of a p2p network. There are two important aspects in
which our model differs from real p2p networks. First, we assume that all nodes are homogeneous
in capacity. It is well known that in addition to residential users with largely homogeneous con-
nections, there are nodes with high-speed connections (e.g., computers in university dorm rooms)
that contribute a large fraction of upload bandwidth and content. Sharers with heterogeneous
upload capacities will typically end up with different expected bandwidths. Numerical simulations
suggest that sharers with larger upload capacities end up obtaining more bandwidth unless upload
capacities are very asymmetric. The reason is that by offering larger bandwidth, a supersharer
‘frees up’ other sharers (as an increased number of peers desire to connect to the supersharer) and
more upload capacity is made available to her.
Consider for example a p2p network with three peers only: two sharers and one freerider. In
this case, there are two stable allocations. Sharer 1 must download from sharer 2 (and vice versa).
Given this, the freerider is indifferent between downloading from sharer 1 or from sharer 2. In both
cases, the freerider obtains an effective bandwidth of 1/2. Depending on the sharer to which the
freerider connects to, sharers may end up with an effective bandwidth of 1 or 1/2, so their expected
bandwidth is (1+1/2)/2 = 3/4. Suppose now that sharer 1 is a supersharer that has λ ∈ (1, 2] units
of upload bandwidth available. In this case, both the second sharer and the freerider will connect to
sharer 1. This is the only stable network configuration. Sharer 1 obtains an effective bandwidth of
1, and sharer 2 and the freerider obtain λ/2 > 1/2. Clearly, the supersharer benefits the most from
19Given N the expected congestion of sharers and freeriders will change as the cardinality of S varies.
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offering larger upload bandwidth. The freerider is also better off, but sharer 2 is better off only if
λ > 3/2. Note also that if λ > 2, the contribution of the supersharer is so significant that sharer 2
and the freerider end up with effective bandwidths larger than that obtained by the supersharer.
Second, our model assumes that every peer connects to one sharer only. While this was the
case in earlier generations of p2p file sharing networks (such as Napster), new generations (such as
Kazaa and BitTorrent) allow for multiple links. Unfortunately, relaxing the single link assumption
renders the problem intractable. To provide some insight on the effect of multiple links, consider
the following case. Let peers hold L = S − 1 simultaneous links in a p2p network with only one
freerider and S = N − 1 sharers. This construction ensures that every sharer is connected to all
other sharers in all stable allocations. Hence the upload bandwidth contributed by each sharer
is always accessed by the remaining L sharers. This implies that the freerider obtains the same
bandwidth across all her links in all stable allocations,
EˆF =
L
L+ 1
.
We can easily calculate the bandwidth obtained by sharers by taking into account that S/N ·
EˆS + (N − S)/N · EˆF = S/N and N = S + 1, thus
EˆS =
1 + L+ L2
(1 + L)2
.
As in the case of a single link, EˆS > EˆF , and sharers continue to do better than freeriders.
Moreover, the difference in expected bandwidths between the multiple and the single link cases
(given that S = N − 1) is small. To see this, note that expected bandwidths in the single link case
are given by our approximation S/N , which yields S/(S + 1). Then, substituting L = S − 1 in
order to compare both cases we obtain EF ≈ ES ≈ (L+1)/(L+2), and we have that |EˆF −EF | <
1/(2 + 3L + L2) and |EˆS − ES | < 1/((1 + L)
2(2 + L)). Already when N = 10, for instance,
|EˆF − EF | < 0.0076 and |EˆS − ES | < 0.00069.
While asymmetric upload capacities or multiple links affect the exact values of ES and EF ,
what is important for our argument below is that upload capacity is a scarce resource. To sum up,
all peers obtain expected bandwidth close to S/N and we take this approximation as the measure
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of expected bandwidth for all players. For an arbitrary value of θ, expected bandwidth can be
expressed as S/θN . This allows us to easily compute expected congestion in a network with N
peers and S sharers, which is the time required to complete downloads td, as the inverse of expected
bandwidth. Hence, expected congestion for all peers is given by td = 1/
S
θN
= θN
S
. It should be
noted that although bandwidth depends linearly in the number of sharers, expected congestion
does not. This property is crucial to our results. Technically, it ensures that our objective function
is concave in S, allowing for interior equilibria in which sharing and freeriding may coexist for
certain ranges of N . In Section 5 we endogenize the decision to share or to freeride and show that
in equilibrium there is sharing.
5 Equilibrium network configurations
In this Section we analyze the first stage. This is the stage where every peer chooses whether to
freeride or to share (at additional cost cs). In other words, we now endogenize td. In making their
decision, peers consider the effect of their choice on expected download time θN
S
. Equations (1)
and (2) imply that if expected download time was not affected by the sharing decision, no peer
would ever share and the peer-to-peer network would not be viable.
In this Section we take N as given. This amounts to assuming that all peers in the network
obtain positive utility. In general, this will depend on S and the distribution of ρs. We relax this
assumption in Section 6 and let peers decide whether or not to join the network.
We use the following definitions in our analysis:
Network configuration: A partition P = {F,S} of N, where F is the set of freeriders and S
is the set of sharers.20
Equilibrium network configuration: A network configuration where no i ∈ S prefers to
(unilaterally) become a freerider and no j ∈ F prefers to (unilaterally) become a sharer.
To characterize the set of equilibrium network configurations, notice that sharer i will not
freeride if
ud − (cn + cs + ρi) θ
N
S
≥ ud − (cn + ρi) θ
N
S − 1
. (3)
20Notice that a network configuration can be mapped to many different network allocations.
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On the other hand, freerider j will not want to become a sharer if
ud −
(
cn + ρj
)
θ
N
S
≥ ud −
(
cs + ρj
)
θ
N
S + 1
. (4)
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Every equilibrium network configuration P = {F,S} has the following form: F =
{1, 2, ..., n− 1} and S = {n, n+ 1, ..., N} for some n ∈ N.
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The proposition says that if peer i is a sharer in equilibrium network configuration P , then
peer i+ 1 must also be a sharer. Moreover, if peer j is a freerider, then peer j − 1 must also be a
freerider. Thus, the most impatient peers prefer to share while the more patient peers are better
off freeriding. The reason is simple: by sharing content, peers reduce congestion and the (positive)
marginal effect on peer utility implied by lower congestion is proportional to the value of ρi. Peers
for whom the opportunity cost of time is high, are more inclined to share. This is true even though
given any fixed level of congestion, all peers (regardless of the value of ρ) are better off freeriding
than sharing.
We now further characterize the equilibrium network configurations by pinning down to the
fullest possible extent the cardinality of S. Let P = {F,S} be an equilibrium network configuration.
Let ρi be the most patient sharer in S. Equations (3) and (4) imply that
S ≤
cn + cs + ρi
cs
and S ≥
cn + ρi−1
cs
.
Thus,
cn + ρi−1
cs
≤ S ≤
cn + cs + ρi
cs
. (5)
Let I be the set of integers. The following two objects are useful in what follows:
G (ρi) =
{
k ∈ I
∣∣∣∣cn + ρi−1cs ≤ k ≤
cn + cs + ρi
cs
}
(6)
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and
H (ρi) = N + 1− i. (7)
Correspondence G indicates the cardinality of S if the sharer with lowest impatience has time
preference ρi. Function H tells us the number of peers with parameter ρj larger than or equal to
that of peer i.
The solution to the system of equations given by G and H pins down the most patient sharer:
Γs = {i ∈ I |H (ρi) ⊂ G (ρi)} .
Because G (ρi) is a correspondence, Γs may not be a singleton set. The following example illustrates
this approach.
Example 2 Assume there are 22 peers with time preference parameters ρi (i = 1..22) = 1, 3, 4,
5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, and 38. If cn = 1 and cs = 2
we have that Γs = {13}. Thus, there is one equilibrium network configuration: S = {13, ..., 22} (10
peers share and 12 freeride). See Figure 2.
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Figure 2: H (ρi) and G (ρi) – Equilibrium number of sharers.
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Notice that H (ρi) does not change with the values of the parameters. Therefore, to perform
comparative statics we need only look at how changes in the parameters affect the position and
‘slope’ of G (ρi). When cs falls or cn grows, G (ρi) shifts upwards, bringing down the most patient
sharer and thus increasing sharing in the network. We should point out that, depending on the
values of the parameters, there may be no freeriders in the network. Likewise, when cs is large, no
peer is willing to share and the p2p network does not get off the ground.
The difference between the effect of cs and cn on congestion is as follows. When cs increases,
sharers are worse off because they bear additional cost. Freeriding now becomes more attractive.
Sharers with the lowest time preference parameters ρi will prefer to freeride and congestion in-
creases. When cn increases, however, both sharers and freeriders bear additional cost. In this case,
sharing becomes more attractive. Sharers do not gain from becoming freeriders as freeriders also
bear cn. Freeriders can reduce (somewhat) the negative effect of cn on their utility by becoming
sharers and thus reducing td. Not all freeriders will find it advantageous to become sharers but those
with the largest time preference parameters ρi will. This is why sharing increases and congestion
falls when cn grows.
Peer-to-peer file-sharing clients often offer incentive schemes that promote sharing to lower con-
gestion. In essence, these mechanisms redistribute bandwidth away from freeriders towards peers
who share. The work of Moulin and Shenker in [29] and [30] is helpful to analyze these allocation
mechanisms: the p2p network can be understood as a production process with a unique input
and output – upload bandwidth and download bandwidth. The structure of the p2p network is
conducive to an equal sharing rule, while bandwidth allocation incentive schemes aim to implement
a serial sharing rule. The former allocates an equal share of download bandwidth to all peers;
the latter allocates download bandwidth across peers as a function of their comparative upload
bandwidth contribution. As a result, serial sharing ensures freeriders obtain little download band-
width (so there is little free lunch), but may require a central authority in the network to allocate
bandwidth. Incentive schemes in p2p file sharing clients approximate this rule in a decentralized
network by implementing tit-for-tat reciprocity among peers. Of course, if we allowed for such
incentive schemes in our model, we would obtain even more sharing.21 We see the result that even
21The effect of these bandwidth allocation rules is similar to that of altruism or reciprocity between peers; in
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in the absence of such incentives there may be sharing in equilibrium as one main contribution of
our approach.22
Feldman et al. [17] analyze the incentives for peers to share as a function of the low-level
architecture of TCP-IP networks. Their simulations show that sharing can increase the download
latency experienced by sharers, particularly when the level of sharing in the network is high, in
turn reducing the incentives to share. This effect operates similarly to congestion in our analysis.
If sharers faced increased download latency in our model, this would reduce the overall degree of
sharing in the network. The impact of congestion depends on the number of peers participating in
the p2p network and the marginal cost of sharing, while the impact of download latency depends
on the overall degree of sharing and packet prioritization schemes. It is unclear a priori how both
effects compare. We see the results in Feldman et al. [17] as complementary to ours. While in their
paper it is the download latency experienced by sharers that averts sharing, in ours individuals
freeride because of the additional costs cs that sharers bear (uplink bandwidth, using additional
hardware resources, and increased likelihood of legal action).
5.1 Full vs. partial sharing
Let S = {n, n+ 1, ..., N} be the set of sharers in an equilibrium network configuration. It is useful
to define the following:
Full-sharing equilibrium: An equilibrium network configuration where n = 1, that is, all
peers are sharers.
Partial-sharing equilibrium: An equilibrium network configuration where n > 1, that is,
both sharers and freeriders are present in the network.
In a full-sharing network, congestion is minimized as the expected download time for all peers
td is equal to θ. For a full-sharing network configuration to obtain, every peer must realize higher
utility by sharing than by freeriding. In particular, the most patient peer ρ1 must be better off by
both cases the marginal utility of sharing is increased. We have analyzed extensions where sharers are favored and
freeriders punished. As expected, congestion is reduced and scalability improves. Unfortunately, a model with such
extensions becomes intractable when we introduce the firm (Section 6).
22Napster, the first file sharing network deployed on a large scale, operated with no incentive schemes to promote
sharing. Nonetheless, the network continued to operate up until its forced closedown with usage peaks of over one
million simultaneous users. The Napster protocol was reverse-engineered after the shutdown and continued to operate
in parallel on several smaller networks.
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sharing (given that everybody else shares):
ud − (cn + cs + ρ1) θ ≥ ud − (cn + ρ1) θ
N
N − 1
.
Solving for N we obtain:
N ≤
cn + cs + ρ1
cs
. (8)
Therefore, if N is sufficiently small, the unique equilibrium network configuration has all peers
sharing content. Notice that as the incremental cost of sharing cs approaches zero, the maximum
network size that supports full sharing grows without bound. Inequality (8) also reveals that when
cn is large, everybody shares. In this case, peers suffer more from congestion and are all better
off sharing. Finally, if the most patient peer is very impatient (ρ1 large), then all peers prefer to
share. When N is large, the equilibrium will typically entail partial sharing. In this case, expected
download time will be larger than θ for all peers.
As mentioned above, the additional cost borne by sharers cs reflects the cost of uplink band-
width, the cost of the computing resources made available by sharers (such as processing capacity or
hard drive space for songs that perhaps sharers are not listening to any longer but that nevertheless
offer so as to liberate traffic from other sharers), and the additional prospect of legal action against
them (over and above to that faced by freeriders). The opportunity cost of the uplink bandwidth
for a given sharer depends on the applications she uses. One may argue that for many individuals,
uplink traffic is very small (e.g., a click requesting a web page) and the congestion cost to sharing
should then be small. Our model predicts that when the additional costs of sharing are small,
there is ubiquitous sharing and this helps our argument that selfish individuals may prefer to share
rather than freeride in anonymous, decentralized p2p networks. We note that while sharing may
not affect web browsing much, increasingly widespread applications such as video conferencing and
online gaming can be seriously affected by p2p. In addition, as broadband infrastructure continues
to improve, the bandwidth requirements of p2p will also increase with advances in content driving
the exchange of high definition video or next-generation video games. In all likelihood, p2p uplink
bandwidth will remain costly for time to come.
If individuals care mostly about downlink speed, upgrading uplink speed is a pure positive
21
network externality. A coordination problem may then arise for peers upgrading to Internet plans
with large upload bandwidth capacities. For instance, Verizon’s FiOS project can provide much
higher symmetric bandwidth than previous generation broadband infrastructure. ISPs such as
Verizon, however, must also account for the impact of p2p traffic on their network when designing
Internet plans for consumers. Since customers choose among these predefined plans instead of
selecting upload and download capacities separately, the severity of coordination issues is probably
diminished.
Although bandwidth is not a pure public good because it is rival, our model of endogenous
congestion is related to work in public economics that studies the private provision of public goods.
This literature proposes two approaches to modeling the decision to contribute: the self-interested
approach of Bergstrom et al. [6] where individuals are concerned about the total supply of public
goods, and the ‘warm-glow’ approach of Andreoni [2] where individuals ‘feel good’ when they
privately provide public goods. Our approach is closer to the former. In fact, ours is a model of
negative warm-glow (or cold -glow) because sharers bear additional costs (cs) that can be avoided
by freeriding. Compared to the self-interested approach our model is similar in that individuals
care about the total amount of public good available and different in that the decision of how much
to share is discrete (all or nothing). In this sense, ours is a model exclusively about the ‘extensive
margin’ – the decision of whether or not to become a contributor – whereas Bergstrom et al. [6]
considers both the extensive and the ‘intensive margin’ – the decision of how much to contribute.23
Our model is also related to that of Bliss and Nalebuff [8], where society awaits for a supplier
to provide a public good in a dynamic setting. The value of the public good is discounted by the
delay in its provision, and individuals have incentives to wait in order to freeride on someone else
supplying the good. The individual with the lower provision cost becomes the first-mover, preferring
to supply the public good rather than wait for someone else to do so. In our model, individuals
with high discounting costs are the ones that provide bandwidth to the network – a similar trade-
off between discounting delay and provision costs drives supply in both cases. Contrary to their
23Anecdotal evidence suggests that users of file sharing networks experiment in setting the p2p software parameters
that determine the bandwidth allocated to uploads. That is, the decision to share is, to some extent, continuous.
The aggregate equilibrium upload bandwidth predicted by our model can also be interpreted as the steady state of
a process where peers decide how much upload bandwidth to offer.
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approach, however, our model is static (there is no waiting game) and the total level of public good
is the sum of the contributions of many individuals. Moreover, the marginal effect of an individual’s
contribution to the public good depends on how much others have contributed.
5.2 Equilibrium with ρi ∼ U [0, ρ¯]
We have characterized the equilibrium for the general case, without specific assumptions on the
distribution of ρis or the cardinality of N. In order to ensure tractability when we introduce a
profit maximizing firm (Section 6), we make the additional assumption that ρis are i.i.d. U [0, ρ¯].
This allows us to further characterize the set of equilibrium network configurations.
Proposition 2 identifies the most patient sharer as a function of the parameters. Identifying
precisely the most patient sharer will allow us to easily analyze how the different parameters affect
network congestion. In particular, we are interested in the effect that N has on congestion. If
congestion decreases when N grows, then the p2p network becomes gradually more valuable as the
number of peers expands. If, on the contrary, network congestion grows with N , the value of the
p2p network decreases with size.
Proposition 2 Let ρs(N) be the most patient sharer in equilibrium. Then, for N large,
ρs(N) ≃
ρ¯ ((N − 1) cs − cn)
ρ¯+Ncs
.
Notice that ρs(N) is increasing in N . This implies that the larger the cardinality of N is, the
lower the proportion of sharers in equilibrium is. In other words, the p2p network exhibits negative
network effects (past the threshold network size of full sharing): the larger the number of peers, the
lower the average utility that peers obtain. In fact, as N → ∞, ρs(N) → ρ¯. Therefore, when the
network is very large, there is essentially no sharing.
The following result is a direct implication of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 When N is large, the equilibrium cardinality of S is:
SN ≃
ρ¯+ cs + cn
1
N
ρ¯+ cs
. (9)
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Notice first that dSN/dN > 0: as N grows, the number of sharers does not decrease. However,
SN →
ρ¯+cs+cn
cs
<∞ as N →∞. Therefore, the proportion of sharers converges to zero as N grows.
In other words, the expected download time (θN
S
) grows without bound as N increases. This means
that large p2p networks operate worse than smaller ones. The intuition lies on the effects of network
size on the marginal utility of sharing. As the network grows, ‘sharing’ makes less of a difference on
the reduction of congestion and the incentives to share fade. This problem is similar to the classic
‘moral hazard in teams’ (Holmstrom [22]) where team members contribute effort only to the extent
that marginal benefit is larger than marginal cost. When the team grows, marginal benefit tends
to decrease and freeriding grows. This effect is felt by all peers, but those with higher disutility of
congestion suffer a larger decrease in utility when N grows. This has important implications for
the equilibrium pricing strategy of a firm competing for customers against a p2p network (Section
6).
The costs of using the network (cn and cs) play a crucial role in determining congestion and thus
the viability of p2p file sharing networks. In fact, given a large N <∞, congestion may be low if cs
is small and/or cn is large. Differentiating N/SN with respect to cs we see that congestion worsens
as the cost of sharing increases. Clearly, as cs grows, fewer and fewer peers find it attractive to
share. As a consequence, congestion increases and all peers in the network are worse off. Actions
targeting an increase in cs (such as suing sharers) reduce the attractiveness of the network.
The derivative of congestion N/SN with respect to cn is negative. However, although there is
less congestion when cn grows, all peers wind up worse off as du
f
i /dcn < 0 and du
s
i/dcn < 0 except
for ρi = ρ¯ for whom du
s
i/dcn = 0. That is, in the case of ρi ∼ U [0, ρ¯] the positive effect of lower
congestion is more than offset by the negative effect of larger cost cn. Therefore, increases in cs or
cn end up hurting peers.
It is easy to see that the utility of peers increases as residential broadband infrastructure im-
proves (lower θ). The availability of larger bandwidth reduces congestion and allows downloads to
complete faster. ISPs also report that a small number of residential customers are responsible for
a large proportion of total traffic. Our model is consistent with this observation because sharers (a
small number in large networks) generate higher volumes of traffic than freeriders.24
24File sharing may very well be the killer app that broadband had reportedly been missing. File sharing accounts
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Corollary 1 helps explain why the p2p ‘industry structure’ is characterized by the presence of
multiple, independent file sharing networks. The model suggests that as network size grows and
congestion worsens, peers are better off forming new networks with fewer peers (initially) and faster
download speeds. The number of coexisting networks must then be a function of population size
and the scalability of p2p technology. Although we do not pursue this research question here, it
is worth pointing out that to study the equilibrium number of p2p networks and their sizes one
would want to work with a model that captures the positive network effects resulting from having
higher content variety in larger networks.25
5.3 On the empirical relevance of the analysis
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical estimates exist for the model’s main parameters (cs and
cn) or the distribution of ρ. This makes it difficult to calibrate the model and explain available data
on p2p file sharing networks. In general, with non-degenerate distributions of ρ, the model predicts
that a large proportion of peers share for low values of N , and that the proportion is low for large
values of N . For example, suppose that N = 100, cn = 10, cs = 0.5, and that ρ ∼ U [0, 100]. In this
case, about 73.6% of peers would share. On the other hand, when N = 1, 000, 000, about 0.02% of
peers share. And when ρ ∼ U [0, 100], cn = 10, cs = 0.01 and N = 1, 000, 000, about 1% of peers
share.
Empirical estimates of the proportion of sharers in p2p networks are in the ballpark of 20%.26
A reasonable estimate of the number of peers logged in peer-to-peer file sharing networks at any
given time is 10,000,000.27 However, while the number of active peers at any given time across all
networks is large, N should be interpreted as the number of peers in a given p2p network engaged in
the exchange of a given subset of content. For example, a peer downloading music over BitTorrent
for a large share of Internet traffic across data networks worldwide, even as the capacity of broadband infrastructure
available to residential users varies substantially from country to country. (See the data published by CacheLogic,
Parker [32], the traffic measures on Japanese ISPs performed by Nissho Electronics co., and the data on traffic of
Spanish ISPs disclosed by Telefo´nica during the Internet Global Congress 2006.)
25Asvanund et al. [5] show that the variety of content available in p2p networks is increasing and concave in network
size. Positive network effects can be captured in our model by assuming that peers value content variety, a function
of network size: ud(N) = N
α with α ∈ (0, 1). The tradeoff between content variety and congestion determines the
optimal network size. We do not follow this approach as the model with content variety becomes intractable when
we introduce a profit maximizing firm that competes against the network (Section 6).
26See for example Hughes et al. [23].
27See Johnson et al. [25].
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does not interact with peers on eMule, Gnutella, or other file sharing networks. Similarly, a peer
interested in contemporary jazz music is unlikely to be interested in modern country music. The
relevant N for such a peer is not 10,000,000 but the smaller community with similar music interests
she might exchange content with within a given file sharing network.
For a rough estimate of what the relevant Ns might be, consider the fact that the largest p2p
network is BitTorrent with approximately 60% of worldwide p2p traffic, and that a conservative
estimate of the share of peers exchanging music in any given p2p network is 33% (the real share
is probably lower).28 Thus the relevant number of simultaneous peers exchanging music in a
given file sharing network is at most 2,000,000. And to the extent that music genres may be
good proxies for boundaries between interest groups, the relevant Ns become much smaller. For
the case of pop, with a reported market share of 7.1% of music sales, the relevant N would be
N = 2, 000, 000 ∗ 0.071 = 142, 000.29 A 20% sharing ratio would then imply that S = 28, 400.
The model with uniformly distributed ρ predicts that a large proportion of peers share for low
values of N , and that this proportion is low for large values of N , unless cs is very small. It is easy
to see that given values of N , ρ¯, and cn, the equilibrium S (eq. 9) can take any value (from 2 to
N) for any given value of cs. For instance, to obtain a sharing ratio of r in the network, we require
cs =
(1− r)ρ¯+ cn
rN − 1
,
a very small number when N is large. Thus, to reconcile the model with the evidence, we need cs to
be small. Is this reasonable? We believe that cs is likely to be small when N is large. The likelihood
of legal prosecution is probably the most important component of cs, and since the probability of
being caught sharing decreases with the number of peers in the network, it seems reasonable that
cs could be very small when N is large.
30
A small cost of sharing cs is needed for reasonable levels of sharing to occur when N is large.
What about the benefit from sharing? The benefit from sharing is captured by the reduction in
28See the Ipoque 2008/09 Internet Study.
29See the Taylor Research & Consulting Group data for 2006 on music sales collected by genre.
30A more complete model would have cs = cs(N) with limit of cs(N) as N →∞ being zero. For example, we could
have cs = 1/N . In this case, if N = 142, 000, then cs = 0.000007.
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congestion from becoming a sharer (td(S − 1)− td(S)). This is a decreasing function of S:
td(S − 1)− td(S) =
N
(S − 1)S
.
Thus, for a sharing ratio of 20%, we have that S = 0.2N and
td(S − 1)− td(S) =
25
N − 5
,
which is small when N is large. For example, when N = 142, 000, we have td(28, 399)−td(28, 400) =
0.00017. Therefore, both the cost and the benefit of sharing are small when S is reasonably large.
Given this, it is not entirely clear that inequalities (3) and (4) are reasonable drivers of peer behavior
when S is large: the cost/benefit trade off appears to be too insignificant for peers to pay much
attention to it.
This raises the question: how relevant is our analysis if, in reality, peers are unlikely to pay much
attention to inequalities (3) and (4) when S is large? The answer is that the analysis is relevant to
explain why there is sharing but not to explain the exact levels of sharing that we observe in some
p2p file sharing communities. While the benefit of sharing for the 28, 400th sharer of pop music is
close to zero according to inequalities (3) and (4), the magnitudes involved become more significant
for smaller sharing ratios (low values of S) and for the most impatient sharers (those with large
ρi). If S = 300, the reduction in congestion achieved by the 300
th sharer is td(299)− td(300) = 1.58
units of time. If S = 100, the 100th sharer is reducing congestion by 14.34 units of time for all
peers. These improvements in congestion are likely to be taken into consideration by peers.
Thus, the model explains why sharing arises in the network and how it evolves with network
size. The model, however, is not sufficiently detailed to explain the larger levels of sharing observed
in some p2p communities. In addition to endogenous congestion, there are other factors that should
be accounted for to explain real-world sharing data. All large and successful p2p networks currently
in operation implement incentive schemes that drastically affect how bandwidth is redistributed
across sharers and freeriders. And while our model focuses on self interest, social preferences
(altruism, reciprocity, or social norms) and unawareness (‘sharing’ is usually the default behavior
of client software) can also contribute to explain the observed levels of sharing. We see the large
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literature in computer science and economics on sharing with social preferences as complementary
to our approach.
The explanatory power of endogenous congestion, incentive schemes, social preferences, and
unawareness is likely to be different at different stages in the life cycle of p2p networks. Our
model suggests that endogenous congestion is likely to play an important role early in the life
of a p2p network, before it becomes large, since the impact of sharing on congestion is always
large for small N (because S must be small then). Our model also shows that as N grows, so
does congestion, consistent with the available empirical evidence on congestion. With large N ,
however, the impact that any individual has in lowering congestion also decreases. This suggests
that incentive systems in client software, social preferences, and unawareness become important
factors to explain sharing. This is consistent with the observation that new p2p clients with
incentive schemes, status-based user communities and non-technically-savvy users have become
more prominent with the widespread adoption of p2p file sharing.
To conclude our discussion on the empirical relevance of the model, we note that fully rational
peers would always take inequalities (3) and (4) into account. But when S is large, the behavior of
some sharers is unlikely to be driven by these inequalities alone. Instead of full rationality, we could
have assumed a threshold on the ability of peers to perceive the benefits of their sharing, such that
for S > S∗ the inequalities no longer apply. Even with such a threshold, our main results would not
change: we would still have a positive level of sharing in equilibrium, and congestion would worsen
as N grows. Moreover, the results for the firm that we present in the following section continue to
hold (at least qualitatively). Thus, our findings under the assumption of full rationality would be
preserved.
6 The firm
We next introduce an online firm that sells digital information goods also available on the p2p
network. To the firm, the network is a competitor because peers that choose to download files from
the network could otherwise become paying customers. In the absence of altruism towards artists,
it is an interesting question why consumers would pay to purchase content online. Empirical studies
28
have shown that preferences for content available on p2p networks are similar to those for products
available in traditional distribution channels.31 Furthermore, the variety of content available on
major file sharing networks after many years of operation is still unmatched by licensed online stores.
This suggests that preferences for content do not explain why individuals choose to purchase from
online stores.
Because content is free on p2p networks, for the firm to persuade users of digital content to
pay positive prices, it must offer added benefits that file sharing networks cannot match. Online
distributors such as Apple’s iTunes Store offer content on a traditional client-server architecture
and operate in agreement with intellectual property right holders. In our view, the most important
advantages of licensed online distribution are: (1) it offers lower download time with no congestion,
as consumption of content acquired from the firm can be enjoyed almost immediately at the moment
of purchase, and (2) content is of higher quality for consumers since it is legal and offers advantages
over that available on p2p, such as improved metadata and no spoof files.
We next express the utility of consumers purchasing from the firm by taking into account the
above. Let uf be the utility that consumers derive from content obtained from the firm, where
uf ≥ ud, and let p be the firm’s price. A song can be downloaded from iTunes over a broadband
connection in a few seconds, and furthermore, the industry seems to be engaged in an assertive push
towards content streaming.32 To capture this fact, we let the firm offer immediate consumption.
Buyer i obtains the following net utility when purchasing content from the firm:
ui = uf − p, (10)
Notice that (10) is the natural adaptation of (1) and (2) to the case of immediate consumption.
As the expected download time td falls down to zero, the terms cn + ρi and cs do not appear in
(10). Thus the firm offers instantaneous downloads and higher quality content, but contrary to the
31The media industry has recognized the value of the Internet as a tool to learn about consumer preferences and
it is increasingly using the web to better estimate demand. See Bhattacharjee et al. [7].
32New players in this market such as Amazon and Google offer content streaming. This allows for real-time viewing
of content purchased. Streaming of audio and video content over broadband under client-server architectures is a
proven, well-established technology. Reliable content streaming over peer-to-peer architectures, however, remains a
theoretical construct known to present several technical complications. See Habib and Chuang [21] and Pai and Mohr
[31].
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network, it charges positive prices.
We assume for simplicity that the firm has zero marginal cost and that the p2p network and the
firm offer the same content. Individuals face the choice of purchasing from the firm or downloading
content off the network for free. Additionally, individuals have the outside option of not consuming
content at all. The outside utility is normalized to zero.
We modify the timing accordingly and solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the
first stage, the firm chooses the price at which content is sold. In the second stage, individuals
choose to either purchase from the firm, enter the network, or not to consume. Those who enter
the network may share or freeride. In the third stage, agents in the network interconnect and all
downloads take place.
Let δ := uf − ud denote the marginal utility that consumers derive from the superior quality of
the content distributed by the firm. The following proposition characterizes the demand faced by
the firm.
Proposition 3 The firm faces the following demand function:
q =


M if p ≤ θ(cn + cs) + δ (full coverage)
(1− p−δ−θ(cn+cs)
θρ¯
)M if θ(cn + cs) + δ < p ≤
θ(cn+cs)(ρ¯+Mcs)
Mcs
+ δ (high coverage)
max[(1− p−δ
θ(ρ¯+Mcs)
)M, 0] if θ(cn+cs)(ρ¯+Mcs)
Mcs
+ δ < p < ud + δ (low coverage)
max[(1− p−δ
θ(ρ¯+Mcs)
)M, 0] if p = ud + δ (outsiders only)
0 if p > ud + δ (no demand)
Figure 3 shows the shape of the demand curve and illustrates how the size of the p2p network
is determined by the price charged by the firm.
Both models of digital distribution are interdependent. Individuals with high disutility of
congestion prefer to buy from the firm rather than obtaining content from the network for free.
These individuals benefit the most from fast downloads. As they choose to purchase, the network
becomes smaller and the proportion of peers who are better off sharing increases (see Section 5.2).
As a consequence, congestion falls. Hence the size and efficiency of the network is affected by the
presence of the firm.33
33We should point out that the result that congestion falls when the network shrinks (regardless of the value of N)
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Figure 3: Demand function and size of the p2p network.
Full market coverage is obtained at any price less than or equal to pfc. The individual who
suffers congestion less (ρi ≃ 0) purchases at this price out of indifference (and all other individuals
strictly prefer to purchase) rendering the network empty. Any price above pfc ensures that some
individuals prefer the network. Above this price, both distribution models coexist. Demand is
characterized by a non-derivability at price pnd. This price separates two ranges over which the
behavior of congestion in the network differs. Below pnd full sharing holds. In this case, congestion
is not affected by peers entering or exiting to purchase. Above pnd partial sharing holds. Here
congestion varies with network size; the smaller the network, the lower the level of congestion. This
is true although the population of peers that remain in the network are on average more patient
and, thus, less inclined to sharing; the effect induced by the reduction in network size is always
stronger, resulting in a larger proportion of peers sharing content.34 Finally, p = ud+ δ = uf is the
maximum price that the firm will ever charge. Any higher price will be met with no demand.
An increase in the marginal utility that consumers derive from the better quality of the content
relies on our assumption that ρi are uniformly distributed. For some distributions, a smaller network could result
in higher congestion. However, as shown in Section 5.1, when the network is sufficiently small, congestion is always
minimal, regardless of the distribution of ρi.
34Consider a reduction in price. In the full sharing price range, peers who switch to purchase are not affecting
the congestion experienced by those stay in the network. But in the partial sharing price range, peers leaving are
(indirectly) reducing congestion by reducing the size of the network. This effect ensures that fewer peers will leave
the network in response to a price reduction when price is above pnd.
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distributed by the firm δ has two effects: it shifts the demand curve up and it reduces the range
of qs for which the p2p network has partial sharing. As the firm becomes comparatively more
attractive, fewer and fewer individuals are ready to join the network. When δ is high, the number
of individuals ready to join the network is so low that only full sharing occurs. For any price at
which the market is uncovered, market coverage increases with δ.
Given the demand function derived in Proposition 3, the firm sets p to maximize profits. The
next proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 4 Profits are increasing in the size of the market M , in the marginal utility that
consumers derive from the superior quality of the content distributed by the firm δ, in the spread in
the distribution of impatience ρ¯, in the costs of using the p2p network cs and cn, and in the inverse
of the residential capacity offered by the broadband infrastructure θ.
When market size M is large, the firm sets a high price and the marginal buyer is indifferent
between joining the p2p network and not consuming at all. Intuitively, the demand lost to the p2p
network N is small relative to M and the firm is better off ignoring the network by pricing at the
monopoly price p = uf . When M is low, the demand lost to the p2p network N is large relative
to M and the firm benefits from prices below the monopoly level. In fact, when the market is very
small, the firm must fight for share very aggressively; so much so, that it ends up capturing the
entire market through low prices.
As δ increases, the firm’s offering becomes more attractive. This allows the firm to charge higher
prices and derive higher profits. An increase in δ can be implemented, for example, by improving
metadata, providing complementary goods not readily available on the p2p network such as album
art or artist information, reducing DRM restrictions for consumers and offering personalized content
recommendations.
When ρ¯ is low, the relative value of obtaining content from the firm vs. the network is low
(as, in this case, peers become patient and do not feel much of the discomfort of congestion). As a
consequence, the firm must set low prices to gain market share.
Increases in cs and cn render the network less attractive but have no effect on the value of
purchasing from the firm. The most obvious way for the firm to increase cs and cn is by suing peers
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exchanging content in p2p file sharing networks. Targeting sharers ensures the impact is felt on cs.
Finally, when broadband infrastructure improves (smaller θ), congestion decreases and the rela-
tive attractiveness of the p2p network improves. To take actions that affect the quality of residential
bandwidth (upload mainly) may be unfeasible, but selective degradation of file sharing traffic serves
the same purpose. Prioritization schemes favoring commercial traffic strengthen the competitive
position of the firm and weaken the file sharing network. Such schemes can be implemented through
agreements with telecommunications operators or vertical integration.
Figure 4 illustrates the four different market coverage levels that may arise in equilibrium. In
each case, the graph on the top shows demand (black line), marginal revenue (discontinuous blue
line), equilibrium price (horizontal dotted line), and equilibrium revenues (yellow area).35 The
graph at the bottom shows profit as a function of quantity sold.
High Market 
Low Market 
Outsiders 
Full Market 
Figure 4: Firm prices and profits in the four equilibrium market coverage levels.
The effect of the network on the firm can be likened to a low quality firm competing against a
vertically differentiated competitor. On the surface, the basic idea is the same: the firm sells a high-
quality good to consumers with high willingness to pay for quality (those for whom congestion is
costlier). Contrary to a standard vertical differentiation framework, however, the quality of the p2p
network depends on its size (how many peers are in the network and the proportion of sharers vs.
freeriders). When choosing prices, the firm internalizes the endogenous quality of its ‘competitor.’
35Our assumption of zero marginal cost implies that revenue maximization is equivalent to profit maximization.
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Thus the insight delivered by our model is that the firm has an additional incentive to charge high
prices. The reason is that when prices are high, more consumers prefer to download from the p2p
network. As a consequence of the increased number of peers in the network, congestion worsens
and the value of the network decreases, in turn increasing the attractiveness of the firm.
7 Concluding remarks
We have presented a simple formal model to analyze some aspects of the interaction between p2p
and online stores, two alternative models for the distribution of digital information goods. Although
the two models have emerged only recently, it is more likely than not that they will endure. iTunes
is legal and has grown spectacularly since its inception. Because peer-to-peer file sharing activity
is mostly illegal, one is tempted to believe that legal attacks against p2p with the goal to shut
them down will continue and eventually succeed. However, due to their decentralized nature, p2p
networks have proven difficult to block. We expect our analysis to stay relevant going forward.
The effects of p2p file sharing on content providers are significant, and can be compared to those
of cassette recording in earlier analog technological generations. The cassette recorder allowed indi-
viduals to generate unauthorized copies and to illegally share copyrighted content lowering potential
revenues to content providers. Analog content sharing was subject to quality degradation and re-
quired physical exchange, which mainly confined the process to relatively small social networks.
By eliminating these restrictions, peer-to-peer file sharing technology has increased the accessibility
and attractiveness of unauthorized content replication. The threat of p2p is not different in nature,
but of much larger scale as it does not require the exchange of a physical support: p2p networks
allow individuals who have never met and who may be located far apart to exchange digital content
as easily as if they were close next-door friends.
The content industry has so far faced the new online paradigm as a threat more than as an
opportunity. But the need to embrace digital distribution seems obvious by now; there is no way
back to a world of physical distribution only. Due to this transition and the increasing relevance
of the online channel to reach consumers, we expect ISPs to play a stronger role in shaping market
structure. We also expect the content industry to reassess their revenue models. Changes towards
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monetizing products not subject to replication, such as the increased attention paid by major record
companies to live concerts and merchandising, may be signals of a new trend.
Our formal model is necessarily partial in that it is focused around characterizing the firm’s
profit-maximizing pricing strategy. More generally (but less formally), to compete effectively
against p2p, online digital distribution must strive to become accessible and attractive to con-
sumers. Online content providers are in a unique position to optimize and deliver new experiences
to consumers which cannot be matched by decentralized, self-sustained peer-to-peer networks.
iTunes, for example, provides a better customer experience than file sharing for similar content and
this allows Apple to charge positive prices and make a profit.36 The potential industry-wide revenue
implications of p2p are still uncertain. However, our analysis suggests that there is scope for profit-
maximizing online distributors and content producers to compete effectively against unauthorized
file sharing.
8 Appendix – Proofs
This appendix contains all the proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. Sharer i ∈ S will not free ride if (3) or
S
S − 1
≤
cn + ρi
cn + cs + ρi
is satisfied. Notice that
d
(
cn+ρi
cn+cs+ρi
)
dρi
=
cs
(cn + cs + ρi)
2 > 0. (11)
Therefore, if (3) is satisfied for sharer i ∈ S it is also satisfied for all sharers i′ with ρi′ ≥ ρi. Thus,
the more impatient a sharer is, the less the incentive to become a freerider. A freerider j ∈ F will
not want to become a sharer if (4) or
S
S + 1
≥
cn + ρj
cn + cs + ρj
36iTunes is easy to use and it is well-integrated with the iPod, it offers a secure and simple payment process, free
samples, album art, personalized recommendations, good karma, and minimum download delay.
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is satisfied. Notice that (11) implies that if (4) is satisfied for peer j ∈ F it is also satisfied for all
peers j′ ∈ F with ρj′ ≤ ρj . Thus, the more patient a freeriding peer is, the less the incentive to
become a sharer.
Proof of Proposition 2. We look for ρs(N) such that the set of peers with i ≥ s (N) all
want to share. Because ρs(N) is the most patient sharer, the cardinality of the set of sharers is
S = N − s (N) + 1.
For S to be the set of sharers of a stable network configuration, it is necessary that the most
patient sharer does not want to freeride:
ud −
(
cn + cs + ρs(N)
)
θ
N
S
≥ ud −
(
cn + ρs(N)
)
θ
N
S − 1
This expression implies that
ρs(N) ≥ (N − s (N)) cs − cn.
Therefore, for S = N − s (N) + 1 to be stable, ρs(N) must satisfy ρs(N) ≥ (N − s (N)) cs − cn.
We also need that the most impatient freerider does not want to share:
ud −
(
cn + ρs(N)−1
)
θ
N
S
≥ ud −
(
cn + cs + ρs(N)−1
)
θ
N
S + 1
This expression implies that
ρs(N)−1 ≤ (N − s (N) + 1) cs − cn.
So, we need that
ρs(N)−1 ≤ (N − s (N) + 1) cs − cn and (N − s (N)) cs − cn ≤ ρs(N).
Suppose now that all ρis are drawn from a uniform distribution ρi ∼ U [0, ρ¯]. When N is
large we have that s (N)− 1 ≃
ρs(N)−1
ρ¯
N . Furthermore, large N also implies that ρs(N) ≃ ρs(N)−1.
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Therefore s (N) ≃
ρs(N)−1
ρ¯
N + 1 ≃
ρs(N)
ρ¯
N + 1. Substituting in the expression above, we obtain
(
N −
ρs(N)
ρ¯
N − 1
)
cs − cn ≤ ρs(N)(
ρ¯N − ρs(N)N − ρ¯
)
cs − ρ¯cn ≤ ρ¯ρs(N)
ρ¯ ((N − 1) cs − cn)
ρ¯+Ncs
≤ ρs(N).
When N is large we have that s (N) − 2 ≃
ρs(N)−2
ρ¯
N . Furthermore, large N also implies that
ρs(N)−1 ≃ ρs(N)−2. Therefore s (N) − 2 ≃
ρs(N)−2
ρ¯
N ≃
ρs(N)−1
ρ¯
N or −s (N) + 1 ≃ −
ρs(N)−1
ρ¯
N − 1.
Now, substituting in the expression above, we obtain
ρs(N)−1 ≤ (N − s (N) + 1) cs − cn
ρs(N)−1 ≤
(
N −
ρs(N)−1
ρ¯
N − 1
)
cs − cn
ρ¯ρs(N)−1 ≤
(
ρ¯N − ρs(N)−1N − ρ¯
)
cs − ρ¯cn
ρs(N)−1 (ρ¯+Ncs) ≤ ρ¯ ((N − 1) cs − cn)
ρs(N)−1 ≤
ρ¯ ((N − 1) cs − cn)
ρ¯+Ncs
So, when N is large we have that
ρs(N)−1 ≤
ρ¯ ((N − 1) cs − cn)
ρ¯+Ncs
≤ ρs(N).
We conclude that when N is large
ρs(N) ≃
ρ¯ ((N − 1) cs − cn)
ρ¯+Ncs
.
Proof of Corollary 1. We have that S = N − s (N) + 1 and s (N) − 1 ≃
ρs(N)−1
ρ¯
N .
Furthermore, we have just seen that
ρs(N)−1
ρ¯
=
(N − 1) cs − cn
ρ¯+Ncs
.
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Therefore,
S = N −
(N − 1) cs − cn
ρ¯+Ncs
N
= N
(
1−
(N − 1) cs − cn
ρ¯+Ncs
)
= N
(
ρ¯+Ncs − (N − 1) cs + cn
ρ¯+Ncs
)
= N
(
ρ¯+ cs + cn
ρ¯+Ncs
)
.
Proof of Proposition 3. An agent with disutility of congestion ρi will purchase from the
firm iff:
uf − p ≥ ud − (cn + cs + ρi)td,
or equivalently
ud + δ − p ≥ ud − (cn + cs + ρi)td.
Because td ≥ θ, if the condition is satisfied for peer i it will also be satisfied for peer i+ 1. So,
the agents who most suffer congestion are the ones for whom purchasing the content from the firm
is most attractive. To solve for demand given a price p we proceed by identifying the indifferent
buyer, denoted by ρb. The indifferent buyer obtains the same utility from purchasing content and
from downloading it for free from the network. Hence, all agents with ρi > ρb will strictly prefer to
purchase from the firm. Note that this includes outsiders (individuals who would have experienced
negative utility if in the p2p network), who choose to purchase as long as p ≤ ud+ δ. If p = ud+ δ,
only outsiders buy from the firm, as all other agents obtain strictly positive utility in the network.
If p > ud + δ purchasing yields negative utility and the firm faces no demand. To obtain demand
when p ≤ ud + δ we must solve for ρb, given by:
ud + δ − p = ud − (cn + cs + ρb)td. (12)
Because either full or partial sharing may hold in the network, we consider two separate cases. We
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begin with the latter.
Substituting td = θ
N
S
in (12) and taking into account that congestion under partial sharing will
depend on ρb, as only agents such that ρi ≤ ρb are present in the network:
ud + δ − p ≃ ud −
(
cn + cs + ρ
ps
b
)
θ
N
(
ρpsb
)
S
(
ρpsb
) ,
where
N
(
ρpsb
)
=
ρpsb
ρ¯
M ,
and
S
(
ρpsb
)
= N
(
ρpsb
)( ρpsb + cs + cn
ρpsb +N
(
ρpsb
)
cs
)
=
ρpsb
ρ¯
M

 ρpsb + cs + cn
ρpsb +
ρ
ps
b
ρ¯
Mcs


= M
(
ρpsb + cs + cn
ρ¯+Mcs
)
.
Thus,
ud + δ − p ≃ ud −
(
cn + cs + ρ
ps
b
)
θ
ρ
ps
b
ρ¯
M
M
(
ρ
ps
b
+cs+cn
ρ¯+Mcs
) .
Solving for ρpsb yields:
ρpsb =
(p− δ)ρ¯
θ(ρ¯+Mcs)
.
We can now use this result to identify the boundary price which separates the full and partial
sharing range. For the network size to equal the full sharing boundary size,
ρpsb
ρ¯
M =
cn + cs
cs
.
Substituting ρpsb and solving for p:
pnd =
θ(cn + cs)(ρ¯+Mcs)
Mcs
+ δ.
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We denote the boundary price by pnd to indicate that demand exhibits a non-derivability at this
point. For any price below pnd only full sharing will hold in the network, hence td = θ.
We now solve for the indifferent buyer in the full sharing case by substituting td = θ in (12):
ud + δ − p ≃ ud −
(
cn + cs + ρ
fs
b
)
θ,
and solve for ρfsb :
ρfsb =
(p− δ)− θ(cn + cs)
θ
.
The demand function for the firm is given by:
D = (1−
ρb
ρ¯
)M . (13)
Substituting ρpsb we obtain the expression for demand in the partial sharing range:
Dps = (1−
p− δ
θ(ρ¯+Mcs)
)M .
Note that this expression may yield negative values for higher values of p. Substituting ρfsb in (13)
we obtain demand in the full sharing range:
Dfs = (1−
p− δ − θ(cn + cs)
θρ¯
)M .
Full market coverage is obtained when ρfsb = 0, which implies:
pfc = θ(cn + cs) + δ.
A lower price will also ensure that the market is covered.
Proof of Proposition 4. Direct inspection of the demand function reveals that there are
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four candidates to optimal price:
pfc := θ(cn + cs) + δ (full market coverage)
phc :=
1
2(θ(ρ¯+ cn + cs) + δ) (high market coverage)
plc :=
1
2(θ(ρ¯+Mcs) + δ) (low market coverage)
poc := ud + δ (outsiders only coverage)
Consequently, there are four candidates to maximum profit:
pifc =M(θ(cn + cs) + δ) (full market coverage)
pihc =
M
4ρ¯θ (δ + θ(ρ¯+ cn + cs))
2 (high market coverage)
pilc =
M(δ+θ(ρ¯+Mcs))2
4θ(ρ¯+Mcs)
(low market coverage)
pioc = (ud + δ)(1−
ud−δ
θ(ρ¯+Mcs)
)M (outsiders only coverage)
That the comparative statics within each region are as stated in the proposition, is immediate.
That is, profits are strictly increasing in M , δ, cs, and θ, and weakly increasing in ρ¯ and cn.
Now, because the demand function is continuous (though not differentiable at several points),
the profit function is also continuous. Therefore, the comparative statics carry across the different
regions of the profit function (i.e., there are no discontinuities in the comparative statics as we
move from one region to the next).
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